Florian Amette
Security Engineer & Editor
Security engineer writing practical guides on industrial control system and operational technology security, from protocols and architecture to standards and incident response.
ExpertiseICS SecurityOT SecurityIEC 62443NIST SP 800-82Industrial ProtocolsMITRE ATT&CK for ICS
Latest articles
Use MITRE ATT&CK for ICS in practice: its 12 tactics, sub-techniques, assets and detections, with jq queries, Navigator layers and coverage mapping for OT.
Build an OT incident response plan around safety and process continuity: roles, decision rights, playbooks, evidence from PLCs and HMIs, and verified recovery.
Run OT vulnerability management that works: read CISA ICS advisories, pull CSAF data, check KEV, rank by exposure and consequence, then patch or compensate.
Design vendor remote access to OT you can approve, watch and revoke: brokered sessions, DMZ jump hosts, MFA, time limits and firewall rules to enforce it.
Design OT network segmentation that holds up: zones, an industrial DMZ, adjacent-level firewall rules, ICS protocol allow lists, data diodes and safe rollout.
Build an OT asset inventory safely: SPAN and TAP placement, Zeek with CISA ICSNPP parsers, Wireshark filters for ICS protocols and which attributes to record.
What NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 covers section by section, how its OT overlay tailors SP 800-53, and how to use it with the Rev. 4 draft now out for comment.
How the ISA/IEC 62443 series is organized, how zones and conduits and security levels work, and how asset owners, integrators and vendors each use it.
Factual case studies of Stuxnet, the 2015 and 2016 Ukraine grid attacks and TRITON: how each attack worked, mapped to ATT&CK for ICS, and the defensive lessons.
Why Modbus/TCP, DNP3, S7comm and EtherNet/IP are insecure by design, which secure variants exist, how OPC UA security modes work and how to monitor them.
The Purdue model explained level by level for ICS security, where the industrial DMZ fits, and where cloud, IIoT and remote access break the classic hierarchy.
How OT security differs from IT security: safety and availability first, deterministic timing, 20 year lifecycles, fragile devices, and what to do about it.