IEC 62443 Explained: Zones, Conduits and Security Levels
How the ISA/IEC 62443 series is organized, how zones and conduits and security levels work, and how asset owners, integrators and vendors each use it.
ISA/IEC 62443 is the reference standard series for securing industrial automation and control systems (IACS). It is written by the ISA99 committee and published by both ISA (as ANSI/ISA-62443) and the IEC (as IEC 62443). If you work in OT security you will meet it in procurement specs, vendor certifications, regulator expectations and internal architecture reviews.
The series is large and the documents are paid, which is why many engineers only know it through slides. This guide explains how the parts fit together, what zones, conduits and security levels actually mean, and how to start applying them to a real plant without reading every page first.
Who the standard is for
62443 is unusual because it assigns responsibilities to different roles in the IACS supply chain instead of addressing one organization:
- Asset owner: the organization that operates the plant and is accountable for the risk. It runs a security program and defines the security level each part of the system needs.
- Integrator / service provider: designs, builds, commissions and maintains the automation solution. It must deliver a system that meets the owner's requirements and follow secure practices on site.
- Product supplier: builds the components (PLCs, HMIs, network devices, software) and must follow a secure development lifecycle and expose the security capabilities the system design needs.
Most confusion about 62443 comes from reading a part meant for a different role. A plant manager does not need the component requirements of 4-2 in detail; a PLC vendor does.
How the series is organized
The series is split into four groups. The table lists the parts you will meet most often, with titles as published by ISA.
| Part | Title | Main audience |
|---|---|---|
| 1-1 | Terminology, concepts, and models | Everyone |
| 2-1 | Security program requirements for IACS asset owners | Asset owner |
| 2-3 | Patch management in the IACS environment (technical report) | Owner, supplier |
| 2-4 | Security program requirements for IACS service providers | Integrator, maintainer |
| 3-2 | Security risk assessment for system design | Owner, integrator |
| 3-3 | System security requirements and security levels | Integrator, owner |
| 4-1 | Secure product development lifecycle requirements | Product supplier |
| 4-2 | Technical security requirements for IACS components | Product supplier |
Group 1 holds concepts and terminology. Group 2 covers policies and procedures (the security program). Group 3 covers the system as a whole. Group 4 covers individual components and how they are developed. ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1 was revised in 2024, so check which edition your contracts reference.
The seven foundational requirements
Everything technical in 3-3 and 4-2 hangs off seven foundational requirements (FRs). Learn these first, because both system requirements (SRs in 3-3) and component requirements (CRs in 4-2) are grouped under them:
- FR 1, Identification and authentication control (IAC): identify and authenticate every human user, software process and device before access.
- FR 2, Use control (UC): enforce the privileges an authenticated user is allowed (authorization, least privilege, session limits).
- FR 3, System integrity (SI): prevent unauthorized manipulation of data, software and firmware.
- FR 4, Data confidentiality (DC): protect information on communication channels and in storage from disclosure.
- FR 5, Restricted data flow (RDF): segment the system into zones and conduits and limit unnecessary data flow. This is where network segmentation lives.
- FR 6, Timely response to events (TRE): log, monitor and respond to security violations.
- FR 7, Resource availability (RA): keep the system available against denial of service and degraded conditions, including backup and recovery.
Notice the ordering against an IT mindset: availability and integrity get as much weight as confidentiality, which matches the priorities described in OT vs IT security.
Zones and conduits
A zone is a grouping of logical or physical assets that share the same security requirements. A conduit is a grouping of communication channels that connect zones and share the same security requirements. Conduits are not just cables or VLAN trunks: a conduit includes the channels, the protocols and the boundary devices (firewalls, gateways, data diodes) that protect them.
Zones let you stop thinking about hundreds of individual hosts and start thinking about a handful of security domains. Typical zones in a process plant might be:
- the safety instrumented system (SIS) controllers and engineering station,
- the basic process control system (BPCS) controllers and I/O for one process unit,
- the operator HMIs and SCADA servers for that unit,
- the site operations zone (historian, engineering workstations, patch server),
- the industrial DMZ that brokers traffic to the enterprise.
Each zone gets a target security level, and each conduit between zones gets its own requirements. A conduit between the SIS and the BPCS, for example, should allow only the specific read path the control system needs.
Zones are a design concept, not a mandate to use the Purdue model. Many plants map zones onto Purdue levels because it is familiar, but 62443 lets you partition by function, criticality, location or ownership. Rules of thumb that hold up in practice:
- Safety systems always sit in their own zone.
- Devices connected through external or wireless networks get their own zone.
- Temporarily connected devices (laptops, USB media, vendor equipment) are treated separately from permanent assets.
- Assets with different owners or different patch regimes rarely belong in the same zone.
For the network side of this (firewalls, the IDMZ, rule design), see OT network segmentation and the industrial DMZ.
Security levels
A security level (SL) expresses how strong the protection of a zone or conduit should be, defined by the type of attacker it must resist:
| Level | Protects against |
|---|---|
| SL 0 | No specific requirements |
| SL 1 | Casual or coincidental violation |
| SL 2 | Intentional violation using simple means, low resources, generic skills, low motivation |
| SL 3 | Intentional violation using sophisticated means, moderate resources, IACS-specific skills, moderate motivation |
| SL 4 | Intentional violation using sophisticated means, extended resources, IACS-specific skills, high motivation |
The standard uses three flavors of SL, and mixing them up is the most common mistake:
- SL-T (target): the level the asset owner decides a zone or conduit needs, as an output of risk assessment.
- SL-C (capability): the level a component or system can reach when configured correctly. Vendors claim SL-C for products against 4-2; integrators claim it for systems against 3-3.
- SL-A (achieved): the level actually reached in the installed, configured system.
The goal is simple to state: for every zone, SL-A must meet SL-T, using components whose SL-C makes that possible. In practice SLs are often expressed as a vector across the seven FRs rather than a single number, because a zone may need SL 3 for integrity but only SL 1 for confidentiality.
SL requirements are implemented through requirement enhancements (REs). In 3-3, SR 1.1 (human user identification and authentication) applies at SL 1; adding RE 1 (unique identification and authentication) raises it for SL 2; adding RE 2 (multifactor authentication for untrusted networks) is needed for SL 3, and so on. Reading the SR plus its REs tells you exactly what a given SL demands.
Risk assessment with 62443-3-2
Part 3-2 describes how to get from a system under consideration to zones, conduits and SL-Ts. It is structured as a sequence of zone and conduit requirements (ZCRs):
- ZCR 1: identify the system under consideration (SUC), including its perimeter and access points.
- ZCR 2: perform an initial cybersecurity risk assessment, typically worst case, assuming the threat succeeds.
- ZCR 3: partition the SUC into zones and conduits.
- ZCR 4: compare the initial risk with the organization's tolerable risk.
- ZCR 5: perform a detailed risk assessment for each zone and conduit where risk is not tolerable, including threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, existing countermeasures and the SL-T.
- ZCR 6: document cybersecurity requirements, assumptions and constraints, including zone and conduit drawings.
- ZCR 7: obtain asset owner approval.
The output is a cybersecurity requirements specification (CRS) that the integrator designs against. Consequence analysis in OT usually reuses the plant's existing process hazard analysis (HAZOP, LOPA), which is why 62443 work goes faster when safety engineers are in the room.
Getting started as an asset owner
You do not need to certify anything to get value from 62443. A pragmatic first pass looks like this:
- Build the inventory. You cannot draw zones around assets you do not know. Start with passive OT asset inventory and engineering documentation.
- Draw the current zone and conduit diagram. Include every path between zones: routed links, dual-homed hosts, remote access, removable media and wireless.
- Assign provisional SL-Ts. Use consequences, not asset types. The SIS and anything that can open a breaker or a valve gets a higher SL-T than a reporting historian.
- Run a gap analysis against 3-3. For each zone, walk the SRs and REs for its SL-T and record what is missing. Typical gaps: shared accounts (FR 1, FR 2), unrestricted flows (FR 5), no central logging (FR 6), untested backups (FR 7).
- Feed the gaps into the program. Part 2-1 expects a managed program with governance, so roll the findings into budgets and maintenance windows rather than one-off projects.
Using 62443 in procurement
Two parts are especially useful when buying:
- Require 2-4 from integrators and maintenance contractors. It defines capabilities such as secure remote access, account management, malware protection and patch management that a service provider must be able to deliver. Pair it with your vendor remote access rules.
- Ask product suppliers for 4-1 and 4-2 evidence. A 4-1 conformant development process gives you a vulnerability handling process and security update commitments, which directly affects OT vulnerability management. A 4-2 SL-C claim tells you which zones the product can live in.
Third-party certification schemes exist (ISASecure is the best known, run by the ISA Security Compliance Institute). Certification is useful evidence, but always confirm which part, which SL and which product versions a certificate covers.
How 62443 relates to other frameworks
62443 is not the only framework you will use. NIST SP 800-82 explicitly references 62443 and uses the same zone and conduit vocabulary in its architecture guidance. MITRE ATT&CK for ICS is a good way to test whether your SL-T assumptions match real adversary behavior: the attacks in the ICS attack case studies used IACS-specific skills and significant resources, which is SL 3 and SL 4 territory. Use 62443 for structure and requirements, and threat intelligence to keep the targets honest.
References
- ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards (ISA)
- IEC 62443-3-2:2020, Security risk assessment for system design (IEC Webstore)
- IEC 62443-3-3:2013, System security requirements and security levels (IEC Webstore)
- IEC 62443-4-1:2018, Secure product development lifecycle requirements (IEC Webstore)
- IEC 62443-4-2:2019, Technical security requirements for IACS components (IEC Webstore)
- IEC 62443-2-4:2015+AMD1:2017, Requirements for IACS service providers (IEC Webstore)
- ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance
- ISASecure certification programs
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security
- MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: Network Segmentation (M0930)